Seahawks Third Down Defensive "Disaster"
The Seahawks defense suffered a third down "disaster" in week 1 versus the Rams, allowing 11/17 conversions. Matty F. Brown explores the 9 clear passing downs Seattle gave up and how they can learn:
A 17-point defeat, a 30-13 loss, and the reemergence of defensive pain.
It was meant to be cured. National media had hyped Seattle’s secondary as the Legion of Boom 2.0. The team made serious investment for inside and outside quarterback hunters. Furthermore, the Seahawks’ bold approach up-front—prioritizing lightness, speed, and playing with two edges in even fronts—was supposed to benefit this pass rush.
Week 1, then, was all the more disappointing. Seattle partially achieved their goal of defense: they were stingy versus the run, holding the Rams’ backs to 2.2 yards per carry—or, if you exclude the run-heavy, garbage time last drive, a still-impressive 2.6 yards per carry average.
What the Seahawks defense failed to do came in the “reward” part of football, the bit many thought they would be good at. Having “stopped the run,” Seattle did not “have fun.” They “earned the right to rush the passer,” but, frustratingly, could only hit Matthew Stafford two times on 38 total drop backs.
The Rams converted 11 of 17 third down attempts, way above the 50% conversion rate Seattle wants to limit opposing offenses below. “A third down disaster for us,” Pete Carroll assessed in his post-game press conference. He wasn’t wrong.
Particularly galling: nine of the 11 third down conversions came off 3rd and 4+ situations, the very, “clear passing down” scenarios the Seahawks want to go enjoy themselves in. Instead, 124 of Stafford’s 334 passing yards arrived in 3rd and 4+.
It is abundantly clear where Seattle’s defense must improve heading in the following 16 games of the 2023 season.
“The biggest thing is that we have to get off the field,” linebacker Bobby Wagner said in his post-game presser. “Like, third downs were really bad. We kept extending the play.”
“We just couldn’t get off the field on third-down,” agreed linebacker Jordyn Brooks, speaking in the locker room, later adding: “We’ve just got to clean some things on defense for third-down and we’ll be right where we need to be.”
Having one specific area to improve can be viewed as a positive. However, there is no simple fix to third downs, no magical tweak to scheme or personnel exists. Rather, each part of the Seahawks must improve moving forward.
“We just need to execute,” Wagner added. “They made some great throws, but we could do better overall. The whole defense, from the rush to the linebackers to the secondary. We could all do better.”
Scheme and Data
Scheme-wise, Seattle tried a bit of everything.*
Out of the 13 3rd and 4+ situations they faced, the Seahawks came out in dime personnel, six defensive backs, on 12 of the 13 plays, as a response to the 11 personnel, three wide receivers, one tight end, one running back, that the Rams exclusively used in these spots.
In coverage, the Seahawks employed man on five of the 13 plays (38.5%) and zone eight times (61.5%). They ran middle field closed, one-high safety coverages nine times, a 69.2% usage that was slightly higher than their whole game MFC percentage of 60.2%.
Eight different coverage concepts were called in these situations. Man defense of cover 1 rat, cover 1 no rat, and a 2-man looking defense. And then zone of cover 3 sky, cover 3 buzz, cover 3 creeper, cover 3 fire zone, and cover 4.
For the pass rush, Seattle mixed up their fronts. 69.2% of the time they were in a two-three technique, even front. But the Seahawks also showed an overload. And to try influence pass protection, Seattle walked one or more defenders down to the line of scrimmage to “mug” open gaps up front on five separate occasions, 38.5% of the 3rd and 4+ down and distances.
The Seahawks sent additional pressure, five rusher blitzes, on four of the 13 snaps (30.8%), and a “creeper” on one single occasion, putting their total usage of pressure concepts in 3rd and 4+ at 38.5%. Pass rush game/s featured 61.5% of the time.
*Please note I excluded the last 3rd and 8 from my data as it was an obvious run, end of game, garbage time situation
Perhaps, then, Seattle tried to do too much. My charting shows them using 12 unique play combinations (front, stunt, coverage) out of that 13 play sample size. This adds context to the Seahawks’ low level of pre-snap disguise, and also partially explains the poor execution you’re going to see from multiple players on the tape.
The Tape
“You're dealing with a veteran quarterback, multi-time Pro Bowl guy that can see some stuff and the ball gets out pretty quickly,” defensive coordinator Clint Hurtt said on Thursday.
“There's times where, you’ll always hear me say, where ‘It's always rush and coverage work together,’ because it's very true. There's times the ball can come spitting out fast where the rush doesn't have a chance, but we want to be tight and have a feel and understanding of routes and what's coming, so the same anticipation that the quarterback plays with, we can play with, and at the times that the coverage does a great job of disguising and holding and make him go to the second progression, definitely on the third progression, then as rushers we've got to be there. We've got to at least be able to get him off the spot, and that's the area of big improvement for us that we've got to be better.”
5:10 1st | 3rd and 10 | 10-yard-gain
Up first, we have an example of ineffective pass rush. The Seahawks ran cover 2 man-looking pass coverage, although rather than having their safeties play the deep half and the underneath players in inside trail man technique, versus the Rams’ condensed set the safeties stayed tighter to the hashes, like quarters defenders.
The coverage did well initially, seeing the motion to drive-esque concept, at the bottom of the screen, removed. Coby Bryant, handling the exchange of responsibilities with Riq Woolen, got hands on the shallower crosser run by Tutu Atwell, with Julian Love lurking to break on that window, then Bryant moved into the undercut position. Meanwhile, Woolen and Quandre Diggs essentially doubled the deeper dig route of Van Jefferson.
The issue was Stafford had the time in the pocket to move off this side of the coverage to his backside return route. Questions can be asked over the leverage and eyes Jordyn Brooks played with on this route. But the biggest issue was Seattle missing their pass rush opportunity.
Versus the five-man pass protection, the center clearly pointed out pre-snap that the protection was sliding to Seattle’s right—meaning Boye Mafe and DreMont Jones were one-on-one to the left. Yet the Seahawks only ran a tackle-end exchange game with Jarran Reed and Uchenna Nwosu on the right of the offensive line, where it was that duo versus three linemen.
The idea of this pass rush game is that it should be run towards the man side of the protection, where—like a pick-and-roll in basketball or a slant-rub passing route combination—it separates, getting one man clean. Either Reed—the 2023 pass rush game caller—didn’t identify the protection slide properly. Or Jones and Mafe didn’t hear his call/recognize the opportunity. You can also see that Jones rushed in a wide path that was not suited to the tight game run on the opposite side of the rush, ended up knocking Mafe over.
“Frustrated,” Carroll described on Monday of how the pass rushers were feeling.
“We need to be more pointed on some of the stuff we’re trying to do. We didn’t get the game plan carried out the way we would like it as well. Communication is always part of that. First time out where they really got a lot of plays. We weren’t as clean as we could be and we will be when we get better. J-Reed does a lot of that work and runs the show up there. It’s getting together with him in game situations and responding well. He’s really good at it, his experience shows all the time. We need to play off of him and get benefit out of him.”
“We have got to get to the quarterback plain and simple, we have to get home,” Reed reflected on the third down issues in the post-game locker room.
“We have to win our one-on-ones and we have to communicate as one. That’s unacceptable, that’s on us, we have to take that to the chin. We have to go get better starting Monday.”
“We have to be really astute and take advantage of the looks and make sure that we can maximize the one-on-one opportunities that you get,” Carroll echoed on Monday.
“That’s where J-Reed comes in. He knows how to read it and make the calls and he has the gameplan. We put quite a bit of responsibility on him on the field. We need to take advantage of our opportunities, and that means when you get the one-on-ones, we have to be effective and be a factor, and we didn’t get that done.”
5:51 1st | 3rd and 4 | 5-yard-gain
Not executing up front was present later on the Rams’ opening drive too. Notice on this play how the Rams kept six men in pass protection, meaning Seattle’s four-man rush had no one-on-ones to attack. However, Taylor and Reed still ran into each other when trying a pass rush game.
This chemistry requires work, something defensive coordinator Clint Hurtt alluded to on Thursday:
”Obviously guys getting used to rushing together, with that and the communication and guys kind of getting a feel for how they rush together, but whether it be rushing or coverage, that's what third down is, that's what two-minute is, the ability to win one-on-one situations.”
Stafford, meanwhile, was able to rifle in the above 10-yard completion easily, quicker than basically any pass rush could have reached him. Playing cover 4 to the backside, the quarter-flat defender Coby Bryant played with man eyes on the running back, not seeing Stafford’s intentions.
Meanwhile, both Tre Brown and Love played deep, past the sticks. Van Jefferson’s 8-yard cut to 10 yards was right into the hole of the coverage and Love made a firm hit. With Bryant playing more aggressive to the back, his weak #2, not having one of Brown or Love play tighter feels counterintuitive—hard contact at 10 yards notwithstanding.
“I thought Van Jefferson's 3rd and 10 catch on the end break was a huge freaking huge play, to be able to extend that drive,” Rams head coach Sean McVay stated in his post-game press conference. Los Angeles finished the series with a touchdown.
5:01 1st | 3rd and 4 | 9-yard-gain
The Rams got into the previous position with an “unexpected” run play, targeting Seattle’s dime personnel grouping. Really, the Seahawks should have been in an okay position, given they were in middle field closed defense and technically had the numbers matched in the box.
However, Seattle’s defenders didn’t play with the alignment or eyes for the crunch-style Rams run, with Bobby Wagner sealed out of the play by a free-releasing tackle and Bryant—getting back off the line of scrimmage with the tight end motion—kept away by the free-releasing center. The Rams achieved a crease and a 9-yard-gain. Nevertheless, this is a play that only really works once in this situation. It happens in football.
2:55 1st | 3rd and 4 | 12-yard-gain
The unfamiliarity of dime, though, is relevant. Specifically when it comes to Coby Bryant, the man tasked with playing the dime back. This role assigned Bryant with some work on the inside of cover 3 pass defense structures, an aspect the defender is less familiar with than a Jordyn Brooks, say. This was evident.
On the fourth 3rd and 4+ from the first drive, Seattle had some moving parts going. They rushed Bobby Wagner on a coffeehouse-style misdirection, while still only rushing four by dropping Darrell Taylor back into pass coverage.
The idea showing five-down pre-snap was: to get big-on-big man protection (it worked); keep the running back in protection (it worked); and get Wagner rushing on the back (this didn’t work, the Rams passing off the loop between Mario Edwards and Wagner well).
Bryant, playing on the inside, didn’t seem to hear the coverage communication from Love that a man was arriving on his inside. Whether this was bonus fire zone coverage (Bryant as the middle hook defender relating to the #3, the running back in this case) or just cover 3 with Bryant in the hook (it feels more like this, a “creeper”), Bryant needed to be more inside and deeper with the route distribution.
It looked like he thought Love was playing in the hook, a mistake that makes sense given Bryant spent most of the preseason in Love’s strong safety role. This was an easy concept for the Rams to hit, mesh-like but the receiver sitting down more over-the-ball, short of Taylor but away from Bryant. Los Angeles netted a 12-yard-gain via the coverage mix-up.
0:22 2nd | 3rd and 10 | 11-yard-gain
This six-man pressure from Seattle at the end of the half did get the ball out fast, with the backend playing what looked like cover 1 or possibly a cover 3 bonus fire zone with Nwosu dropping off the edge as a spare low hole defender, Wagner adding on to the back like a hug rush.
Nwosu ideally would have dropped a bit tighter in his assignment. Truly, though, this was a crazy play from Stafford finding his first read, looking Nwosu outside, then throwing his receiver open right into the hole of the coverage, to the inside of Nwosu. Pre-snap, the quarterback also did a great job getting Seattle—trying to disguise their intentions—into tipping their safety rotation. Bryant’s blitz, and Wagner’s rush on the back.
“Obviously the guys, they already know, we've got to be better in the one-on-one rush,” Hurtt reflected on Thursday. “There was times obviously we needed to be significantly better than what we were, and there's others where he [Stafford] can see things, he can figure out the coverage.”
13:34 3rd | 3rd and 4 | 5-yard-gain
The opening drive of the third quarter featured another perfect, quick read from Stafford. “I thought Matthew was excellent,” McVay evaluated post-game. “You could really see—you give him a click and he's able to survey it.”
Riq Woolen, playing a pure-step press technique, had his gate opened by Puka Nacua attacking his outside half vertically. With Seattle playing cover 1 without a rat, sending five at Stafford, there was no help in the low middle of the field and Stafford’s throw to the space netted five yards plus the first down.
Again, the QB used cadence to undress the Seahawks’ rotation and the fact that Bryant was assigned to the running back—indicating this cover 1, no rat blitz. Rush-wise, Dre’Mont Jones slipped trying to run a game with Wagner, damaging the timing of the exchange between the two.
10:35 3rd | 3rd and 8 | 44-yard-gain
This is another example of how the Seahawks could have disguised their intentions more clearly. On the backend, to a quarterback like Stafford, this was obvious pre-snap that Seattle was in a cover 1 man defense.
Up front, the Seahawks tried to cause issues with an overload line, Bobby Wagner mugging the open B-Gap and Coby Bryant creeping down to the line of scrimmage. This saw the Rams look to slide their protection to the side where there were four potential Seattle rushers, leaving their tackle one-on-one with Nwosu and their back responsible for Wagner. Notice the center pointing and Stafford’s communication with his back.
However, the Seahawks rushed this fairly tight. “We didn’t look nearly as active as we needed to in our rushes,” Carroll described to the Brock and Salk Show on Monday.
“We weren’t edged out as well as we’d like to, you know more on the edges of guys so he could feel us. There’s some technical parts of that.”
What technical parts?
“When we pressured they got hands on us, you know, the ball was out so quick that we weren’t able to affect him”, Carroll explained.
“So, it worked together for them. And we were down the middle of guys on our pass rush more than we need to be. And he got the ball out really quick, so he didn’t feel us. And so we didn’t have a factor, he didn’t feel us, you know?
“Staying on the blocks instead of airing them out and making some space for us, so that the quarterback feels the color of the rush,” Carroll further elaborated. “And they did a nice job covering us up and he did a really good job of getting the ball out.”
Indeed, the Seahawks’ rush game may still have caused Stafford some issues if his primary read hadn’t been butt-naked downfield. Instead, the ball was out fast because this “head-start” motion for Atwell saw Brown run into Julian Love.
Seattle adjusted well pre-snap, with Brown playing the mid-level, Artie Burns the press, and Love far off. As Brown navigated over the top of Burns with Atwell going underneath the first inside receiver, Love looked to hold his depth defending close to the sticks.
The delayed release of the third inside receiver, Tyler Higbee, caused significant issues, with Atwell ending up directly in front of the tight end. Love, trying to process the break into the flat, didn’t move backwards enough as Brown tried to start running vertical. The two collided.
“We got bumped in a man-to-man situation on the big corner route that they threw, you know we got rubbed off on ourselves,” Carroll told the Brock and Salk Show on Monday. “And gave them a big play.”
These bunched, stacked and motion-to-condensed looks caused massive issues throughout the game for Seattle. Indeed, the stats are nightmarish, with these looks leading to: 151 of the 331 Rams passing yards, 11 of Stafford’s 24 completions, 5 of the 11 third down conversions, and four out of eight explosive plays.
11:16 4th | 3rd and 11 | 5-yard-gain and first down
When things are bad, sometimes they are really bad. This Seattle redzone usage of cover 3 strong buzz forced Stafford to make a tough throw to the outside route in his double posts passing concept. Even though the quarterback managed to fit the ball over Diggs in the strong hook, the trajectory of the throw saw Woolen undercut the receiver for the pass breakup.
Pass-rush wise, Darrell Taylor had a decent speed rush off the edge that at least made Stafford “feel him", ensuring the ball came out relatively on time and in-structure.
However, sadly for Seattle, Brown—looking to stay in front after connecting well initially with his quick jam, re-set with his hand directly to the face of Van Jefferson. On the backside of the play, in the weak deep third, this action was totally inconsequential to the outcome. Yet it was the correct call from the officials, bringing up five yards and an automatic first down. You can only overcome so many errors in the NFL, and the Seahawks ended up conceding a touchdown at the end of this drive.
7:50 4th | 3rd and 8 | 21-yard gain
Stafford’s quality in this game cannot be understated. He was light outs, All Pro-level, as his last third down pickup demonstrates. Forget any scheme; this is balling.
Against tight man coverage, Stafford—while checking the backside safety for the coverage confirmation—had to move in the pocket from a winning Reed up the A-Gap and take a hit from a disengaging Nwosu, who benefitted from the one-on-one which the overload line created. Unphased, the quarterback threw into space. to an area where only his receiver, Nakua on the sail route, could get it.
“That one late in the game to Puka on the sideline was a pretty good shot,” Stafford illustrated afterwards. “Had some movement in the pocket a little bit and he did a great job at the top of the route and had to throw that one to a spot and he did a nice job catching it. There was a few in the game that are always a little bit more high wire act than others.”
“What a throw to Puka on the right sideline, and he sat in there and deliver it,” McVay praised of his quarterback post-game. “There was a rush bearing down on him, and he's our guy, and he played like the guy that we all know and love, and I'm sure happy to be able to see him out there competing the way he is with his teammates. He elevates everybody.”
Nine Lives
So, the Seahawks gave the Rams nine lives. Obviously, they can’t be giving the Lions that—or any other offenses, feline mascot or not.
Moving forward, the Seattle defenders’ chemistry together must improve. And from a play-calling perspective, a stripped-back menu with a bit more flavor (disguise) from Hurtt might prove beneficial. Time and experience would be a great help for both these aspects. However, Seattle kinda needs this to happen from week 2 onwards.
It’s especially important because the Seahawks’ offense is down both starting offensive tackles and also struggled in week 1. Let’s be clear: the defense must play great football. On all three downs.
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